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1 Introduction
A world in which agents are boundedly rational and thus may make inconsistent choices
is problematic for the welfare economist. In the standard approach to welfare economics,
choice behaviour guides welfare considerations. For a standard preference maximiser there
is no conict between any sequence of choices: for example, if x is chosen and y is rejected
in some circumstance, it never happens that y is chosen in the presence of z and z is
chosen in the presence of x. This feature makes it possible to associate in a direct manner
observed choices with a transitive and complete binary relation R that is being maximised
by choices. The relation R connects x with y if x is chosen when y is available. The binary
relation R is usually, but not necessarily interpreted as the agents revealedpreference.
Whatever the interpretation of R, it is R that is postulated to guide a planners welfare
rankings in standard welfare economics. The planner, when acting on behalf of the agent,
will also seek to maximise R (whether or not the agent is seekingto maximise R). Or at
least the planner, when choosing policies that a¤ect the agent, will take R into account.
For example, if Pareto optimality is a criterion for the planner, the R of each agent will
be the one inputed in the Pareto optimality check.
If instead the choices of the agent are generated by some boundedly rational procedure,
they may not provide any consistent guidance about welfare rankings. Choices may fail
to maximise a binary relation that is transitive and complete. Choices may indeed fail
to maximise any binary relation at all. This destroys the traditional connection between
choice data and welfare analysis. If one wants to perform welfare economics, some change
in approach from the traditional one is needed. In this article we discuss this problem.
We adopt the working hypothesis that, as in traditional welfare economics, choice
data are at the heart of economic welfare analysis and that they can be exploited to
make welfare comparisons between various situations. In particular, we do not assume
the direct observability of happinessor, more in general, mental states. Therefore we
will not consider assertions of the type alternative x should be implemented rather than
alternative y because it will make the agent happier.1 The justication for implementing
an alternative rather than another will always lead back to the agents choices. However,
as we shall see, we will also support committing to a hypothesis on the cognitive process
that underlies choices. In other words, we advocate the use of explanations that are not
as if. For this purpose, choice data alone may not be enough. Theories of bounded
rationality are typically weaker (that is, compatible with more patterns of choice data)
than the standard model. In addition, it may be di¢ cult to tell one theory of bounded
rationality from another on the basis of choice data alone. So we do not dismiss as
irrelevant data di¤erent from choices, such as verbal reports or direct information on the
1See Bernheim [5] for a critical discussion of the alternative hypothesis that happiness is observable.
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cognitive processes of decision makers. We argue that such data may be useful in an
auxiliaryrole: they help the observer to make educated guesses about the reasons for
the agents choice, reasons that may be welfare-relevant. Such reasonsmay or may not
take the form of standard preference maximisation - typically, preferences are only one
of the components of the process that drives choices. The crucial distinguishing feature
between the reasonswe consider and other similar concepts like happinessor mental
states is that by reason we mean some cognitive process (as opposed to a given state)
that, while unobservable, has observable correlates in choice that are amenable to testing.
Sens polite guest, who is supposed to never choose the uniquely largest item (see Sen
[38]), will reveal himself as a fraud as soon as he picks the last remaining piece of cake
on the tray, or, in a subtler way, when he fails the restrictions on observable choice data
that a politeness-motivated process of choice implies (Baigent and Gaertner [3]).
Within these boundaries, we propose the following broad categorization into two ide-
alised types of strategies to deal with the welfare problem:
1. model-less approach ;
2. model-based approach.
The model-less approach is identied with the inuential work of Bernheim and Rangel
[6] (henceforth BeRa) and Bernheim [5], though others have contributed in this vein
(e.g. Nishimura [33]). This approach is characterised by the fact that it does not rely
on an explicit model of decision making. The model-based approach relies instead on
some specic model of decision making. Just like standard preference maximisation,
normally such a model still identies some restrictions on choice data: that is, some
data are compatible with the postulated model, and others are not. So it is possible
to reject models on the basis of observable data. But, as argued above, the whole set
of relevant data may include both choice data (in which case revealed-preference types
of empirical techniques that are standard in economics can be employed) and auxiliary
ones. The welfare conclusions that are derived in this way are model-dependent, in that
the same choice data can have di¤erent welfare implications according to the cognitive
process that has generated them. To put it bluntly, choosing x over y cannot, in this
approach, be automatically interpreted as evidence of the welfare superiority of x over
y: such an interpretation needs to be mediated by a specic model and by the empirical
evidence supporting that model. For example, if it is hypothesised that the agent su¤ers
from imperfect attention (as in Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [29] and Manzini and
Mariotti [25]), the choice of x over y might simply mean that the agent has not paid
attention to y, not that x is in any sense better. The task in this case will be, rst,
to validate a specic model of imperfect attention empirically (that is, to check whether
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the data are compatible with such a model) and, secondly, if the model receives empirical
support, to attempt to infer from the data what drove the choice of x over y (inattention
or preference).
The model-less approach is explained and defended at length in BeRa and Bernheim
[5]. Here (section 2) we limit ourselves to a brief discussion of it, and to reporting some
critical developments that we formulate more technically elsewhere (Manzini and Mariotti
[26]). Our main purpose in this paper is instead to articulate the possible advantages of a
model-based approach, discuss some of the problems associated with it and possible ways
to ameliorate them.
2 The model-less approach: which welfare relation?
BeRa have proposed a theory of choice-based welfare analysis that applies irrespective of
whether choice data come from fully rational or from boundedly rational agents. BeRa
aim to dene welfare as choice, and avowedly not as the realisation of objectives inferred
from choices.
They write for example:
choices provide appropriate guidance because they are choices, not because
they reect something else(BeRa p. 2).
non-instrumental justications maintain that choices are normatively com-
pelling simply because they are choices; hence it is possible to dene welfare
in terms of choice without implicitly invoking other objectives.Bernheim [5]
(p. 2)
we propose a generalized welfare criterion that respects choice directly, with-
out requiring any rationalization involving potentially unveriable assump-
tions concerning underlying objectives and their relationships to choice.(Bern-
heim p. 2, our emphasis).
BeRas main methodological device is that of choice with ancillary conditionsin which
a choice situation is not simply described as a menu S from which the agent chooses, but
as a pair (S; d), where S is a menu and d is a description of ancillary conditionsthat are
(or should be if the agent were rational) extraneous to the evaluation of choice objects.
This framework is essentially the same as Salant and Rubinstein [36]s choice with frames:
what the latter call a frameBeRa call an ancillary condition. For example, a frame or
ancillary condition d might indicate a default option, or whether the agent, when stating
his willingness to pay for an object, has been prompted beforehand to state his National
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Insurance Number,2 or the order in which alternatives are listed in the actual description
of S, or the position of the alternatives on a supermarket shelf.
BeRa introduce two binary relations that, they argue, are natural extensions of the
standard complete and transitive relation R to this more general setup. In particular they
suggest that the following binary relation P  is both a correctwelfare criterion to use
in domain of choice problems with ancillary conditions and one that will always yield an
answer. An alternative x is in the relation P  with y if x is sometimes chosen when y is
available (that is, there is at least one choice situation (S; d) for which S contains y and x
is chosen), while y is never chosen when x is available.3 They dene an alternative x to be
a strict welfare improvement over y whenever it is the case that xP y. An alternative x is
a weak welfare optimum in a menu S if and only if there is no alternative in S that weakly
improves on x. The advantage of using P  as a welfare criterion is that it is acyclic, and
as a consequence it never fails to pick welfare optima from any choice situation.
The problematic aspect of this approach is the issue of what respecting choicereally
means.
As explained in the introduction, if welfare is dened as choice, the ideal situation
is one where the choice behaviour of the agent identies a binary welfare relation that
is de facto being maximised by the agent. This relation might be required to satisfy
additional properties, but the basic preliminary question is: When is choice with ancillary
conditions consistent with the maximisation of a binary relation? Unfortunately this
consistency requirement turns out to be extremely demanding: it is in a sense tantamount
to requiring the agents behaviour to be invariant with respect to ancillary conditions. It is
in fact possible to show (Manzini and Mariotti [26]) that choices with ancillary conditions
maximise a binary relation if and only if any alternative which is chosen, in some choice
situation, in the presence of any other alternative in a set (where the choice situation
may vary depending on the alternative), must in fact be chosen from that set whatever the
ancillary conditions that accompany it. For example, if apricot jam is chosen over some
of the other jams when it is on the left of the supermarket shelf, and it is chosen over
the rest of the available jams when it is in the middle of the shelf, it must also be chosen
(possibly together with other jams) when it is displayed on the right of the shelf.
This is a very strong consistency requirement on behaviour, because it essentially
prevents ancillary conditions from playing any substantive role. It is logically impossible
to have a theory of welfare which is valid also for situations in which the agent exhibits
some even very mild form of inconsistency in choice across ancillary conditions, and in
2See e.g. Ariely, Loewenstein and Prelec [2].
3Formally, xP y if and only if there exists no set in which y is chosen in the presence of x. Given that
BeRas choice of domain includes binary sets, then it necessarily follows that if xP y then x is chosen at
least in the binary set for choice to be non empty.
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which the agent is never overruled. At least some of the agents choices will have to be
overruled, as a matter of logic. There is no escape from this. So the real question is: how
should choices be overruled?
2.1 Padding and trimming
BeRa have chosen one particular route to overcome this problem, one that they call
inclusive libertarian. It is inclusive in that it never overrules the agent by eliminating
from the set of welfare optima alternatives that the agent himself would choose. And it
is libertarian in the sense that it uses only the agents choices to determine the set of
welfare optima. This approach falls into a category that we might call that of padding
strategiesin which the set of choices that the agent actually makes are automatically
declared welfare optimal in that situation, and then they are paddedwith other choices,
by sometimes overruling the agent only in the sense of declaring some alternatives welfare
optima (together with the choices of the agent) even when the agent would not choose
them. In BeRas approach this happens whenever the agent has chosen that padding
alternative in some other choice situation. For example, if apricot jam was once chosen
over cherry jam when it was on the left of the shelf, it should be declared welfare optimal
in the set of jams even if it is not chosen when it is on the right of the shelf. This
grounding of the planners selection on the set of choices that the agent sometimes makes
is the libertarian aspect of the approach, but this should not obscure the fact that some
of the agents choices are overruled (which, as explained, is a logical necessity). There are
some choices that the agent would not make in that situation but that the planner would
instead declare acceptable (this leaves open the question of which choice the planner would
ultimately select among the acceptable ones, but we dont dwell on this issue here).
For a padding solution di¤erent from that chosen by BeRa, consider a paternalistic
view, in which the planner would pad the set of welfare optima on considerations external
to the agents own choices. This solution is inclusivebut not libertarian. For solutions
that are not padding, consider trimming solutions, in which the agent is only overruled
by declaring some alternatives not welfare optima, even in principle, even in some choice
situations in which he would choose them (while in the padding approach all choices made
by the agent in some situation are acceptable at least in principle). This is in fact the
route more often taken in alternative, model-based, theories. These theories lay a claim
to identifying the cognitive process that underlies choice and thus to identifying which
choices genuinely have a welfare value.4
4Modern experimental techniques allow for instance the collection of intermediate dataon interme-
diatestages of decision making, both in experimental settings and market settings. These can be used
to identify partially or completely the unobserved procedural components, see e.g. Caplin and Dean
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To summarise, there exists no theory that can have an absolute claim to respecting
choice when choice is nontrivially dependent on ancillary conditions. We argue that the
focus should thus be on the best way to disrespect choice. Any such choice will presumably
be made, even in the model-less approach, on the basis of a meta-theory about the agents
motivation, even if that theory is not spelled out in the form of a model.
It is this kind of considerations that leads us to study the alternative, model-based
approach.
3 Model-based, falsiable explanations of behavior:
advantages
The core of the approach discussed in this section is the premise that, if some choices are
merely the expression of the bounded rationality of the agent, for the purposes of welfare
analysis it is better not to use directly those choices as a basis for welfare rankings.
Rather, a model should be used to sift carefully through choices. We will rst illustrate
some advantages of a model-based approach. Later we will study three classes of potential
failures that may a¤ect model-based welfare analysis, providing some indications on how
to overcome these di¢ culties.
Lets start with an illustration of the contrast between model-based and model-less
welfare analysis in an example o¤ered by BeRa themselves (p. 13).5 Suppose that a
choice set A = fx1; :::; x30; ng consists of thirty types of jams (the xi), plus the option of
choosing nothing (n), and we observe that n is chosen from A. However, suppose we also
observe that x1 (strawberry jam) is chosen when the only other alternatives are xi and
n, for all i = 2; :::; 30. In this case both x1 and n are the strict welfare optima in A, but
this ambiguity in welfare recommendations seems disturbing. Can it really be a matter of
indi¤erence for the planner to give the agent strawberry jam or nothing? We suggest that
an appropriate model of decision making should be sought that formalises (and allows
to uncover) the agents reasons for his conicted behaviour. The model should allow
one to take a stance on the welfare superiority of either n or x1. For example, one might
plausibly hypothesise that the agent su¤ers from cognitive overload, as argued by Iyengar
and Lepper [21]. Such a model would need to be validated by the rest of the available
evidence, both choice based and non-choice based. After such a validation, it would then
[9]; Eliaz, Richter and Rubinstein [16]; Costa-Gomes, and Crawford [12]; and Costa-Gomes, Crawford
and Broseta [13]. Furthermore, the development of econometric techniques allows the identication of
e.g. consideration sets from market data, as in Chiang et al. [11]; Manski [28]; and van Nierop, Paap,
Bronnenberg, Franses and Wedel [32].
5Based on Iyengar and Lepper [21]s celebrated jam study.
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be natural to ignore the choices from large sets for welfare purposes, because under the
assumption that the model is true, those choices express the cognitive limitations of the
agent rather than anything associated with welfare.
3.1 Which model?
Although we will refer to various specic models to exemplify the issue raised (just a
small subset of the recent, rapidly expanding literature in this eld), we are of course
focussing on economic modeling as a methodology, where the ex-ante choice of model will
be suggested by the specic situation at hand, and the ex-post choice between competing
models/explanations will be settled by testing. In this respect, the class of models we
consider falls squarely within the classic economic tradition, in that we only consider mod-
els that are testable. All the boundedly rational frameworks we consider posit that the
economic agent follows some procedure/heuristic, which can be characterised by means of
properties on observed choices. In other words, all these models show the equivalence be-
tween a postulated, unobservable choice procedure and observable patterns in the agents
choices. This is a crucial feature that sets these models apart from the literature on fast
and frugalheuristics program pioneered by Gerd Gigerenzer and Peter Todd and their
adaptive toolbox. While the tof these latter models to the problem at hand can be
measured, the absence of an axiomatization makes it extremely hard to falsify them.6
Lets now examine more systematically what we see as the major benets of a model-
based approach.
3.2 Advantage 1: information e¢ ciency
In the model-based approach, the economists task is to provide the policy maker with a
boxof positive modelling tools from which he can pick according to the scientic evidence
in support of the model and his best contextual judgement. BeRa explicitly reject this
view when they argue for an inclusive libertarian relation. In their approach, the only
means available to disqualify a chosen alternative from the set of welfare optima is thus
to disqualify the choice situation itself in which it is chosen. But this technique may
sometimes be wasteful. The reason is that some choice situations which are suspectmay
nevertheless provide information about the decision mechanisms used by the agent when
crossedwith non-dubious choices. The observations of behaviour in choice situations
have two uses in particular:
1. to infer the cognitive variables that inuence choice; and
6Of course, the fact that fast and frugal types of procedure tend not to be axiomatised does not mean
that they cannot be axiomatised. See e.g. Manzini and Mariotti [23].
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2. to test the theory.
For example, concerning point (1) consider the Revealed Attention model introduced
by Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [29], according to which an agent only pays atten-
tion to a potentially strict subset of the available alternatives, and only maximises his
preferences on that subset (the consideration set). The crucial hypothesis of this model
is that the removal from a menu of an alternative which is overlooked cannot detract
attention from an alternative which is paid attention to: for example, if you normally
only pay attention to the rst page of a Google search, removing items from the second
page does not make you cease to pay attention to the items on the rst page. Similarly, if
alternatives are listed and you usually only look at the rst three items in a list, removing
the tenth item does not alter the set of items to which you pay attention. Suppose now
that, when choosing from a menu fx; y; zg, an agent is observed to select x, whereas when
only x and z are available, the agent chooses z. Under the assumption that the Revealed
Attention model is true, these choices contain the information that y is in the considera-
tion set of the agent in the larger menu even if it is not chosen from it, for otherwise it
could not have a¤ected the agents choice when removed. An observer can thus infer that
the choice of x when y is available must be determined by his preference for x over y,
rather than by some cognitive limitation. The choice from fx; zg may well be spurious
(i.e. determined by attention rather than preference) but eliminating from the domain the
choice situation that generates it, as BeRa would recommend, would be tantamount to
throwing information away. The spurious choice situation can be used to derive insights
on the cognitive process.
On point (2), a spurious choice situation can also be used to test the model non-
parametrically. Consider for example the Categorize Then Choosemodel (Manzini and
Mariotti [24]). A simple revealed preference axiom characterises the following procedure
for choice: the agent rst simpliesthe problem by eliminating some subsets (categories)
of the choice situation he is facing; then he picks the maximal element according to his
preference among the surviving alternatives. The Categorise Then Choose framework
views only choices from binary sets as denitely expressing preference, whereas it views
choices from larger sets as expressing a mixture of preference and a categorisation strategy
to cope with complexity (e.g., rather than comparing pairwise all jams available in the
supermarket, you rst decide on a brand, and then pick your favourite taste produced by
that brand). The model is characterised by a property of a choice function called Weak
WARP (both the model and the axiom will be described more precisely in section 4.1).
This property involves comparing choices from large sets with choices from binary sets.
A violation of Weak WARP allows an observer of choice data to reject the model, and an
observation of such a violation is a composite event involving choices not reecting pref-
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erences, so that the a priori elimination of choice situations where the agent is confused
by complexity would make the model unfalsiable.
3.3 Advantage 2: Precision
The crucial advantage of having a fully edged model of behaviour is that if we understand
the mechanism that leads an agent to make certain choices, we have a better chance to
understand the true connection between those choices and welfare. If, for instance, we
have a validated decision model and a corresponding notion of welfare which predicts that
the agent systematically minimises his welfare in some contexts, we can take his choices
as a guide to enhance his welfare by reversing them or by generating environments where
the agent cannot harm himself.
Since we are not looking for as ifexplanations but rather for realistic decision mech-
anisms, the process of model selection is greatly enhanced by the possibility of rejecting
a model when it does not tally with the choice data. As choice data are easily available
in economics, we view this testability feature as crucial.
Notice that Bernheims [5] assertion that additional evidence (in the form of choice
data or other data validating a model) could also be useful within the BeRa approach
may prove to be slightly impractical,7 in the sense that it is only a specic model that
can provide specic guidance as to the class of data needed to test or falsify the theory.
In other words, what constitutes useful evidence is model dependent: we look for specic
types of evidence, among all conceivable evidence, only because we have a model that
guides us to do so. For example, if we attempt to explain the apparently inconsistent
behaviour of consumers at the supermarket through a model of salience, we may suspect
that choices are a¤ected by the position of the items on the shelf. Then we may look
for evidence of salience-driven behaviour, such as a tendency to focus visual attention
only on a specic subset of the alternatives, such as the items on the left of each shelf or
those on the shelf that is at eye-level. Or perhaps, as in Krajbich and Rangel [20] (with
neuroeconomics evidence) and Reutskaya et al. [34] (in a laboratory experiment), we may
be interested in possible correlations between the probability of an items salience and its
value. The point is that a model-less approach leaves us in a complete void about what
type of evidence to look for.
On the Bernheim logic above, suppose that evidence comes forth to prove that a
model is correct (not just the positive implications, but also its normative interpretation).
In that case, it is argued, the same evidence would justify a restriction on the welfare-
7Bernheim [5], p. 293, states: For example, if (contrary to my expectations) adequate evidence is
assembled to defend a normatively substantive process model, within our framework the same evidence
would typically justify a choice-domain restriction that leads to the same welfare criterion.
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relevant domain in the BeRa setting. For instance, if (as seems reasonable) the individual
never uses satiscing strategies8 within sets consisting of only two elements, then one
could justify restricting attention to binary sets, and the correctwelfare criterion would
emerge.9 The problem with this reasoning, in our view, is that we need a model to show
that (and why) only binary sets are relevant. Once it has been accepted that this model
is correct, the work is done: there is no further scope for a model-less criterion.
As a concluding caveat, we observe that making welfare inferences under the assump-
tion that the model is known is not necessarily a mechanical exercise, which consists
simply of singling out one of the primitive binary relations of the model and declaring
them utility(although in many examples we do so for convenience). It may be the case
that several of the agents objectives have welfare relevant features, and it may also be
the case that such objectives are only partially revealed. For example, if the agent cate-
gorises then chooses, it is possible that the categorisation process itself contains welfare
relevant aspects (if for example a jam brand X is favoured over another brand Y it may
be the case that on average brand X jams prove to be better than brand Y jams). In
these situations, some process of judicious aggregation and completion, which does not
emerge from the choice data, will be necessary. In general, the working hypothesis here
is that making welfare judgments involves some knowledge of what is important for the
agent, and this in turn can be gleaned from information on his decision making process.
3.4 Advantage 3: Scope
While quite general, a model-less approach still rests on some founding assumptions which
limit its scope. In particular, inbuilt in the framework is an hypothesis on how the data
present themselves, namely in a deterministic way. The primitive is a deterministic choice
function c that indicates the selection that the agent makes in each choice situation. Yet
real choice data are typically noisy. For this reason, in recent theoretical works (as well
as some classical ones), the primitive used is a stochastic choice function. The observed
data are assumed to be probabilities of choice (as expressed in frequencies of choice).
This type of data seems particularly apt in the case of modelling of boundedly rational
agent, since a form of bounded rationality is that the agent makes errors with respect
to rational behaviour consisting of the maximisation of a preference relation. It is very
natural to model these errors as random errors. For example, if it is postulated that
bounded rationality takes the form of the agent overlooking some of the alternatives (as
in Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbay [29]), it seems more natural to assume that there is
some probability that an agent overlooks a given alternative in a menu, rather than to
8See Simon [39].
9We thank Douglas Bernheim for suggesting this example.
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assume that he overlooks the alternative for sure. In other words, while the model-based
approach seeks to identify the reasons for behaviour, such reasons often are best thought
of as having a random component. This gives rise to stochastic choices (see e.g. Gul,
Natenzon and Pesendorfer [19] and Manzini and Mariotti [25] for recent examples of this
type of models).10 By denition, the model-based approach poses no limit to the type
of models that can be considered. On the contrary, any model-less approach (and the
BeRa approach in particular) is limited by the assumptions on the underlying type of
choice theory that is being considered. Later in section 4.3 we will argue that a stochastic
modelling of choices may o¤er some advantages.
4 Model based, falsiable explanations of behavior:
problems
Positive decision models are falsiable, but there may be more than one model that is not
falsied by the data. The usefulness of the model-based approach depends on the power
(in a statistical sense) of the conditions that characterise those models to accept the right
model among the potentially many which are not falsied, or in other words to which
degree the conditions that characterise the models are invulnerable to type II errors.11 As
we shall see, this is a critical point in the methodology.
More precisely, we try to systematise the study of failures by classifying them into
three types (two of which already highlighted by Bernheim [5]), that is
 Type 1 failure: two or more plausible positive models are observationally undistin-
guishable in terms of choice;
 Type 2 failure: only one plausible model is compatible with the data, but there is
more than one possible interpretation of the models primitives;
10Apesteguia and Ballester [1], too, assume that decision makers have an underlying true preference
relation guiding their choices, and that any inconsistency in choice is attributable to mistakes. Using as
the basic primitive the frequency with which each alternative is chosen from a set, these authors introduce
the swaps indexwhich measures deviations (swaps) from rationality, and associate to it the deviation
minimising preference relation(s). Although Apesteguia and Ballester do not specify any particular choice
procedure that may cause these mistakes, they show that two general classes of models used to rationalise
stochastic choice, namely random utility models and trembles models, have underlying preferences that
minimise the swaps index.
11A type II error occurs when a test fails to reject an incorrect null hypothesis (false negative). The
power of a statistical test is the probability of not committing a Type II error, that is, it is the probability
of correctly rejecting the null hypothesis when the alternative is true.
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 Type 3 failure: there is only one accepted interpretation of the primitives of the only
plausible model compatible with the data, but there are several specications of the
primitives that are compatible with the data (e.g. the preference relation cannot be
pinned down).
As we discuss below, there may be ways of addressing these failures successfully.
4.1 Type 1 failure: Choice data are compatible with multiple
model structures
As noted by Bernheim [5], some choice data that do not refute a specic model of the
cognitive process underlying choice are also compatible with other plausible models, and
therefore possibly with several welfare relations depending on which model is used. So,
if even there is no choice-based falsication of a particular model, we may still not be
justied in using that model (rather than some other model also compatible with the
choice data) as a basis for normative judgments. Lets call this type 1 failure.
We illustrate this failure concretely with a slightly more technical example. We need
some additional notation and denitions. Let  denote an asymmetric binary relation
on the sets of alternatives, and for each menu A let M (A;) denote the set of all the
alternatives in A that are not elements of any subset of A that is dominated by another
subset of A according to the relation . The way we will interpret this is that sets
of alternatives are categories in which the agent mentally subdivides all alternatives (e.g.
the set of all restaurants), and is a shading relation whereby a category (such as that of
Mexican restaurants) may trump another category (such as Italian restaurants). Choice
behaviour is called Categorise Then Choose (CTC) (Manzini and Mariotti [24]) if there
exists an asymmetric binary relation  on the alternatives (interpreted as preference) and
a shading relation on the sets of alternatives, such that on each menu S the choice is
precisely M (A;).
In contrast, choice behaviour is a Rationalisation choice (Cherepanov, Feddersen and
Sandroni [10]) if there exist K + 1 asymmetric binary relations i, i = 1; ::; K, on the
set of alternatives (the rst K interpreted as psychological rationalesand the (K + 1)th
interpreted as a preference) such that on each menu A the choice comprises precisely those
alternatives that are maximal in the preference relation among all the alternatives in A
that can be rationalised, that is that are maximal according to at least one rationale.
The CTC model and the rationalisation model are structurally dissimilar and they
formalise very di¤erent psychological processes underlying choice. In the CTC model it
is imagined that the agent rst simplies his choice task by categorising alternatives and
ignoring alternatives that belong to losing (shaded) categories, and then makes a choice
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by maximising preference. In the Rationalisation model, on the other hand, it is imagined
that the agent rst selects all alternatives that he can psychologically justify to himself
on the basis of some rationale (e.g. alternatives that are morally acceptable), and then
maximises his preference on the set of rationalised alternatives.
The following result is a consequence of the characterisations in Manzini and Mariotti
[24] and in Cherepanov, Feddersen and Sandroni [10]:
Proposition 1 The following statements are equivalent:
(1) Choice behaviour is Categorise Then Choose.
(2) Choice behaviour is a Rationalisation choice.
(3) Choice behaviour satises the following property (Weak WARP): suppose that an
alternative x is chosen from a binary menu in which only x and another alternative y
are available, and from a larger menu A that contains y. Then y is not chosen from any
menu intermediatebetween fx; yg and A that contains x.
Weak WARP is introduced in Manzini and Mariotti [23]. It is a weakening of the
standard Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference and it can be used to test theories of
bounded rationality just as WARP is used to test the theory of rational choice. So
here we have two models which, in spite of being structurally di¤erent and having very
di¤erent interpretations, generate exactly the same restrictions on choice data, namely
that satisfaction of Weak WARP. Moreover, the rst stage selections and the second stage
preference relation will be typically di¤erent in the two models. This is an example of
Type 1 failure.
How serious is Type 1 failure? There are already several distinct models of boundedly
rational choice in the literature, which are mostly characterised by di¤erent axioms on
observed choice. This suggests that gathering choice data o¤ers good prospects of falsi-
cation in the best scientic tradition. Axioms that restrict choice data are in any case
useful to provide a shortlistof suitable models: for each model, the characterising axioms
do have statistical power against several other plausible alternatives. But, as Proposition
1 makes clear, no one can exclude that a trueunknown model lurks behind a model
which has not been falsied by observations. That is, because the two models in the
statement of the proposition are equivalent, a researcher might be trickedinto using one
model to explain the data, whereas the driver of choices is in fact the other model. This
situation, however, does not appear to be signicantly di¤erent from that in any other
scientic endeavour, notably that of ordinary economic modelling (we return to this point
below). So it is not clear that models of boundedly rational choice should be subjected
to a particular treatment or should raise special concern.
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Moreover, there are e¤ective strategies to increase the identiability of such models
by means of choice data beyond the rst coarse shortlistingstage. One strategy consists
of the use of contextual information and auxiliary data, as we explain below in relation
with failures of Types 2 and 3. Such additional data may help for example understand
whether the agent is categorising or psychologically rationalising his behaviours.
A second (considerably under-used) strategy relies upon parsimonyas a criterion to
rank competing explanations of choice. The concept of parsimony can be operationalised
and made precise, for example, through Seltens Measure of Predictive Success (Selten
[37]). Seltens measure was specically designed to evaluate area theories like those
characterised by revealed preference type of axioms, such as Weak WARP. These theories
exclude deterministically a subset of the possible outcomes, those incompatible with the
model. The measure takes into account not only the descriptive powerof the model
(measured by the proportion of hits, the observed outcomes consistent with the model),
but also its parsimony. The lower the proportion of theoretically possible outcomes
consistent with the model, the more parsimonious the model. More precisely, the measure,
denoted s, is expressed as
s = r   a
where r is the descriptive power (number of actually observed outcomes compatible with
the model divided by the number of possible outcomes) and a is the relative areaof the
model, namely the number of outcomes in principle compatible with the model divided
by the number of all possible outcomes. For a vacuous theory we would have s = 0.
While Selten [37] shows that his measure is the only one satisfying a small number of
appealing axioms, there may of course be other plausible measures of parsimony. Some
measures might be appropriate in some contexts and others in di¤erent contexts. The
point here, however, is that, as we mentioned already, we believe that parsimony criteria
are both severely underused in choice theory research (one notable use in the context
of revealed preference theory is Beatty and Crawford [4]) and potentially tremendously
e¤ective for model selection.
So while Type 1 failure must be taken seriously, it looks far from being damning for
model-based welfare analysis. To complement this point, we conclude by observing that
procedural models can generate behaviour that is consistent with utility maximization.
This makes evident how even standard non-parametric validations of ordinary utility
maximisation are subject to type 1 failure in exactly the same way as models of boundedly
rational choice are. An example is the Checklistmodel of choice (Mandler Manzini
Mariotti [22]). In this model the agent has in mind a sequence of desirable properties. For
example, when buying a car, the properties may be having an automatic gear, meeting
a given budget, coming in a desirable colour, etcetera. When faced with a menu A,
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the agent progressively whittles down the set of eligible alternatives by rst discarding
those that do not possess the rst property, then those that do not possess the second
important property, and so on until only one alternative remains, which is chosen. Not
all choice behaviour can be described in this way. But if it can be described in this way,
we say that it has a checklist. The following result is proved in Mandler, Manzini and
Mariotti [22]:
Proposition 2 (Mandler, Manzini and Mariotti [22]) Choice behaviour maximises a util-
ity function if and only if it has a checklist.
So the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference (SARP), which is normally taken to
validate welfare rankings based on the revealed preference relation, is actually compatible
with the consumer being boundedly rational. If it is actually the checklist procedure that
generates an agents behaviour, the resulting revealed utility is not necessarily a good
representation of that agents welfare. For example, an agent can declare alternative x
better than alternative y (in the sense that he never chooses y when x is also available)
on the basis of the fact that x possesses the rst property P1 while y does not. This
makes sense for an agent who needs to limit the time and computational e¤ort employed
in choosing. But if y possesses all the other properties Pi with i > 1 while x does not, it
is dubious whether x can be declared welfare superior to y by a planner who has the time
and resources to pay careful considerations to all aspects relevant for choice. For a proper
welfare inference a considered judgement, involving an evaluation of the properties and
their importance to the agent, is needed. This is an illustration of the fact that mechanical
recipes for inferring welfare from choice are unlikely to succeed.
4.2 Type 2 failure: Multiple interpretations of the primitives
Even if choice data were compatible with only one plausible model structure, the multi-
plicity of preference relations can be generated simply by giving di¤erent interpretations
to the parameters of the model. As observed by Bernheim [5]: for any process theory,  ,
it is usually possible to formulate other theories simply by reinterpreting and/or relabeling
elements of   (most notably, the elements that are labeled as preferences)(p. 280). Lets
call this type 2 failure.
A clear illustration of type 2 failure is given by Tysons [41] two-stage satiscing-plus
model, which grafts a second stage on a satiscing model à la Simon. In this model
alternatives are assumed to possess both a utility value and a secondary non-utility char-
acteristic, such as visual salience or t with a positive-action legal requirement. The
agent chooses, among the alternatives that are deemed to be satiscingon the utility
criterion, the one with the highest level of the secondary characteristic. So, in our usual
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jam at the supermarket example, imagine that the agent considers as satisfactory both a
cherry jam and an apricot jam at their given prices. He is unwilling to exert the cogni-
tive e¤ort needed to break this utility pseudo-indi¤erence (in Tysons terminology), for
example by examining further the small print on the labels to check the exact list of
ingredients, calorie content, etcetera. Instead, he simply picks, of the two satisfactory
jams, the one that has a brighter label, a characteristic that may be unrelated to util-
ity. Formally, the agent maximises a function s (representing the level of the secondary
characteristic) subject to the alternatives passing a utility satisfaction threshold  (A) for
menu A, that is u (x)   (A) for some utility function u. The one just described is the
intended interpretation of the functions s and u. Observe how the model leaves ample
scope for the interpretation of the second stage characteristic. But even with this leeway,
and even granting the assumption that the model is structurally correct(that is, choices
are compatible with the maximisation of a function s subject to a function u exceeding a
critical level  (A), where the critical level satises the additional cross-menu restriction
that Tyson imposes), there is a di¢ culty: how can we know whether the functions s and
u should be interpreted, respectively, as a secondary characteristic and utility as asserted,
or instead as utility and a primary non-utility characteristic, or indeed whether utility has
anything to do with choice at all? So, in the jam at the supermarket example, perhaps
the consumer is rst focusing on the visually salient jams on the shelves, and then he
picks a satiscing one among these. Or perhaps he is simply responding rst to visual
cues and then making a nal selection on the basis of brand conditioning.
Type 2 failure is indeed a serious problem. Unlike the other types of failures it is
peculiar to models of boundedly rational choice; however it can be mitigated in several
ways.
Solution 1: Manipulation of the external environment. Di¤erent interpretations of
a model will typically lead to di¤erent predictions about choice responses after changes to
the external environment. For example, in the satiscing-plus example discussed before, if
s is interpreted as salience then manipulations of the salience of the objects (e.g. through
an advertising campaign or alterations of the location of the objects in the visual eld)
will have di¤erent choice implications than if s was interpreted as utility, or as anything
else. To the extent that such implications can be tested, a specic interpretation can be
singled out by the data.
Solution 2: Use of auxiliary data. Additional information can usually be obtained in
the form of auxiliary data to help understand which parameter of the model, if any, is most
suitable to be interpreted as preference. Such auxiliary data include all data which, while
obtained during, or in lieu of, or in addition to, the process of choice, are themselves not
physical and voluntary choices within the task of interest. Leading examples of auxiliary
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data are physiological and neurophysiological data recorded during a choice task, or survey
responses and verbal evidence on internal states and personal variables related to choice
tasks. Indeed, in the experimental literature the answer to survey questions are routinely
used as regressors, much like hardevidence. For example, for the satiscing-plus model,
one could control in an experimental setting the environmental conditions a¤ecting the
visual salience of x and y, to show for example that if y is not chosen in the presence
of x, then this cannot be due to xs greater salience. Or, with the usual caveat on
incentive compatibility, one can simply ask the agent to state how aware he was of the
feasible alternatives (voters in an election are routinely asked how aware they are of the
various candidates/parties). Psychological and neurophysiological evidence can serve the
purpose of detecting whether the agent is operating on the basis of dual or multiple selves
(long-runand short-run) or not. Evidence from fMRI studies (e.g. McClure, Laibson,
Loewenstein, and Cohen [31]) suggests that impulsive behavior is associated with the
activation of di¤erent brain areas of the brain than planned behavior. While this type
of evidence is in our opinion usually not conclusive when used by itself, what we are
suggesting is that its use in an auxiliary role, beyond standard choice data, can be of help
in the interpretation of positive models of choice.
Solution 3: Use of contextual information. The ancillary conditions themselves can
form part of the evidence used to select a positive model of choice (this point refers to
type 1 failure, too). For example, if ancillary conditions that make the problem more
complex tend to produce more violations of WARP, this is prima facie evidence that a
model based on complexity may be correct. BeRa argue that this type of evidence should
only guide the selection of choice situations that are included in the domain of choice.
They give the example of the choices of a blind person made in choice situations where
information is presented visually, which should be discarded. But the same argument
that Bernheim [5] makes regarding the use of ancillary evidence to exclude suspect choice
situations can be tuned to select between positive models of choice. For example, ancillary
conditions that a¤ect the salience of alternatives may help interpret the primitives in
the satiscing-plus model. Or, a documented choice fact is the tendency of employees
to place large part of their savings in pension fund of the company for which they work
(eg. Beshears et al. [7]), thus increasing the risk to their wealth to a level that is hard
to justify rationally. Here, there is strong contextual evidence that the workerschoice of
pension plan expresses status-quo bias rather than reasonedchoice. Then, rather than
discarding choice situations, one could use instead positive choice models of status-quo
bias, e.g. Masatlioglu and Ok [30].
Of course, we have only pointed to possibilities that apply to specic contexts. One
may be pessimistic on the e¤ectiveness of contextual, or generally auxiliary, evidence to
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help select between observationally equivalent models: As Berhneim (private communica-
tion) expresses it, Will non-choice evidence help us settle on the right normative model?
Maybe, and maybe not. With very limited exceptions...I dont think we currently know
how to use that data to test between theories, particularly if the theories in question are
normatively distinct but have identical positive implications for choice. Consequently,
a framework that requires such information is (in contrast to the Bernheim-Rangel ap-
proach) not ready for implementation, and may never be.We do not agree that the lack
of a systematic method of using contextual evidence justies a policy maker in ignoring
it. Any contextual evidence which is good enough to exclude some choice situations from
the domain seems to us good enough to help select between observationally equivalent
positive models (in a more e¢ cient way). So the positive approach is in this respect
exactly as implementation-ready as the model-less approach.
4.3 Type 3 failure: Multiple preferences compatible with an
identied model structure
There are cases in which it seems impossible to make choice-based welfare inferences even
when (a) the structure of the model is exactly known and (b) the interpretation of the
primitives is also known. Type 3 failure consists in the inability of choice data to identify
preferences when (a) and (b) hold.
It is important to understand that this problem holds in an exactly analogous form for
rational agents. We give an example from the theory of rational choice over time. Suppose
an agent is shown to satisfy the Fishburn-Rubinstein [17] axioms on preferences over date-
outcome pairs (x; t). Then there are continuous real-valued functions u on outcomes and
 on dates such that (x; t) is preferred to (y; s) if and only if  (t)u (x)   (s)u (y)
(exponential discounting). However, and this is not generally understood, one may x
the discount factor arbitrarily to represent a given preference relation that satises the
axioms, provided the utility functionu is calibrated accordingly.12 In other words, for
any two discount factors  and 0, there exist two utility functions u and v such that (u; )
preferences are identical to (v; 0) preferences. The way out to pinpoint  as a uniquely
determined parameter expressing impatience is to devise an external method to x u. We
suggest the same method may be applied for boundedly rational agents.
We illustrate type 3 failure in detail within the context of one specic model. Con-
sider the particular version of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and Ozbays [29] attention model in
which the consideration set has a threshold structure, that is in each menu A the agent
considers only the alternatives x for which a (x)   (A) where a is a real-valued atten-
tion function on the alternatives and  a real-valued threshold function on the menus, and
12See e.g. Fishburn and Rubinstein [17].
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then maximises a utility function u among those alternatives which exceed the attention
threshold.13
As we discussed before in relation to the satiscing-plus model there is a rst in-
terpretational hurdle: that even if one cannot reject the mathematical structure of the
model, still one cannot identify from choice data whether the model can be interpreted as
described or otherwise. For example one cannot tell whether instead a is a utility func-
tion and u an attention function, so that the agent chooses the most attention grabbing
alternative among those alternatives which are satiscing. That is, choice data cannot
distinguish between this specication of the attention model and (a special interpretation
of) the satiscing-plus model. Nevertheless, set aside this di¢ culty (which as argued
before could be overcome by auxiliary evidence), and assume instead that not only the
constrained maximization structure of the model is correct, but also that the interpretation
of the functions a and u is correct. Does this mean that choices alone revealwelfare?
The answer appears, at rst sight, resoundingly negative. It is in fact possible to show
formally (details available from the authors) that if a threshold representation exists with
a given utility function u, then any other utility function, which respects the indi¤erence
classes of u but arbitrarily reorders them, could also work as an alternative utility function!
So, even with all information about both structure and interpretation of the model, the
choice data leave the utility function almost entirely undetermined. The almostrefers
to the fact that at least the indi¤erence classes can be identied (through the observation
of common membership of the set of chosen alternatives out of some choice set).
As we argued before for the exponential discounting model, we suggest that one pow-
erful way to address type 3 failure is to gather richer data on the choice process, notably:
Solution: The use of stochastic choice data. The collection of choice frequencies
instead of choice events, or the estimation of choice probabilities may improve dramatically
the identiability of the primitives. The attention model of Masatlioglu, Nakajima and
Ozbay [29] provides a particularly sharp example of how this methodology can be used.
We have seen already that this model presents severe type 3 identication problems even
in its threshold version, in that the utility function remains almost entirely arbitrary.
Moreover, in the general version, it may not always possible to determine whether a
choice has been made on the basis of attention or on the basis of preference. For example,
if x is selected from fx; yg and fx; y; zg, y from fy; zg and z from fx; zg, we cannot tell
whether x is chosen over y because it is preferred to y or because y is not paid attention
to in the menu fx; yg. In Manzini and Mariotti [25], we study a stochastic version of the
attention model and we show that if we had access to stochastic choice data, we could
13This type of model is structurally identical to the Tyson [41] satiscing-plus model except that the
threshold function here is unrestricted. We study it in detail in [27].
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tell exactly both the amount of attention paid to each alternative and the preference
relation over them. In particular, we could tell this by observing whether y is chosen
more frequently when x is not available. While we refer to [25] for the technical details,
the intuition is simple. In the stochastic model, each alternative is noticed in a menu with
a given probability, and then the agent maximises utility over the set of the alternatives
that he notices. If x is preferred to y, then the presence of x in a menu will diminish the
frequency with which y is chosen, because whenever x is noticed, y cannot be chosen even
if it is noticed (since in any case the agent would pick x rather than y).
This is just one success storyfor a specic model, but we are fairly condent that
this approach can be extended to help address other instances type 3 failures, which are
so endemic in discrete and deterministic choice models.
5 Conclusions
Bernheim and Rangel [6] have o¤ered an extension of classical welfare analysis to a context
of bounded rationality. We have argued that a promising approach that should comple-
ment their analysis is to try and understand the decision process that underlies choice,
a move that is explicitly rejected by them.14 This raises the need for a validated model
of individual decision-making. The validation of such a model can be executed rst and
foremost, though not exclusively, via a standard revealed-preference type of methodology,
that is by examining the restrictions that the model poses on observable choice data and
checking whether such restrictions are satised by the available data. Caplin [8] goes
further than that, and boldly proposes to extend the entire standard revealed preference
approach to the new types of data which technology makes available (e.g. the collection
of data on dopamine response). Caplins own work makes ample strides in this direction
(see references in [8]). We agree that in the future this type of extension of the revealed
preference methodology might become prevalent. Yet in this paper we have used the al-
ternative and more conservative working hypothesis that non-choice data can be used in
a merely auxiliary role within a process of model selection, giving priority to choice data.
This can be justied on the basis of the advantages from discipline specialisation and
14Space consideration prevent us from doing justice to several other works which, while related to the
theme developed in this paper, are outside the main focus of our analysis. The most relevant is Sugden
[40] whose approach is choice-based and model-less but who, unlike BR, does not advocate any active
role for policy makers, leaving it to the market to determine outcomes. Other authors, e.g. Green and
Hojman [18], have proposed models of choice, with preferences as primitives, but which are not falsiable.
Closer to our methodology are Dalton and Ghosal ([14], [15]), while Rubinstein and Salant [35] o¤er
a general, model-based framework to deal with behavioural datasets, (collections of possibly conicting
preference observations elicited from the same decision maker in di¤erent, preference irrelevant contexts).
21
of imperfections in current technology for collecting non-standard data. In this respect
our working hypothesis is more similar to the position adopted by Bernheim and Rangel.
Nevertheless, we stress that ours was just a working hypothesis: we hope to have shown
that even within its connes the model-based approach to welfare o¤ers much promise.
We have examined some of its problems and have suggested ways of addressing them.
The new and growing literature we have discussed exemplies this process and witnesses
to exciting research at the frontier but, of course, most of the work remains to done.
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